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Abstract: 
 Many philosophers hold that we experience the passing of time.  It is by far the most popular 
view concerning temporal experiences of time.  There is a small minority of philosophers, veridicalists, 
who reject the phenomenology of time passage.  But are there accounts of temporal experiences that 
could support this view?  I think so.  I will examine one particular view of veridicalism, by Christopher 
Hoerl, and examine how extensionalism, a view about our temporal experiences and how we perceive 
change, can offer such account.  With extensionalism, and a few modifications to the general debate, I 
think veridicalism is a strong contender against B-theorist philosophers, philosophers who reject an 
objective passing of time, who do accept the phenomenology of time passage.  To build a case for the 
veridicalist view, I will rely on extensionalism as an account of the temporal present and as an account of 
how we become aware of change.  I will, also, suggest there is a reasonable case to be made for the 
veridicalist view depending on how we view the temporal present in relation to the metaphysics of the B-
theory. 
 Key Words:  Veridicalism, Illusionism, Extensionalism, Temporal Passage 
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Extensionalism and Veridicalism 
 In my dissertation, I intend to answer the question, can extensionalism properly accommodate the 
veridicalist rejection of temporal passage?  My question intersects between several fields, ranging from 
the metaphysics of time, the metaphysics of objects existing in time, the philosophy of perception, views 
about our temporal experiences, and views about how we temporally experience time-flow.  Indeed, many 
of these fields are interesting in their own right, but my dissertation will primarily focus on the 
metaphysics of time, a particular view of our temporal experiences known as extensionalism, and if we 
experience time-flow.  There is much to discuss within this framework, but I have been quite deliberate 
with my question and topics of discussion.  Veridicalism is a B-theory view of time, the view time is 
unchanging, and veridicalists reject that we can have any sensation of time-flow (Baron et. al, 2015, p. 
562).  Veridicalists hold that all we can be consciously aware of is change, and it is by far the least 
favored view concerning time passage (Ibid.).  However, I think there is a reasonable case to be made for 
the veridicalist view.  The veridicalist view I will focus on is by, Christopher Hoerl, and will be explicated 
thoroughly in section one.  I think that extensionalism is a perfect candidate and a natural fit to 
supplement many of the needs of veridicalists.  Accordingly, much of my dissertation will be slanted with 
a favorable view of veridicalism and will focus on extensionalism as an aid to ward off sensations of 
temporal passage and time-flow.   
 I intend to answer my question in the affirmative.  To met the objective of my dissertation, I have 
divided it into three sections.  In the first section, I provide the relevant background information for the 
debate and will argue against a particular type of illusionism.  I will, also, suggest that there is a sense in 
which we can be aware of time’s passing while rejecting time-flow and temporal passage.  In the second 
section, I will provide an exposition of extensionalism that compliments the veridicalist view.  I will argue 
that this construction of extensionalism is a natural fit for veridicalists.  In section three, I will discuss 
illusionism and veridicalism from a different approach than is typically taken, beginning from the 
temporal present while focusing on its relation to the metaphysics of time.  My discussion here will serve 
as what I think is more persuasive rationale than what is typically emphasized for the veridcialist view. 
 Section I: 
A) Metaphysics of Time, Time Passage Thesis, Veridicalism & Illusionism  
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 To begin, I must briefly provide context for the current debate and elaborate on the metaphysics 
of the A-theory and B-theory of time.  A-theorists hold that when an object exists in time, it is not just the 
where that it exists, but also the when.  Typically, A-theorists posit at least one mind-independent time 
property, i.e. the present, or they posit only mind-independent privileged statuses of time in lieu of time 
properties, i.e. the present and past, to explain time passage  (Williams, 1992, p.126; Dainton, 2010, pp. 
68-69).  Time passes on the A-theory and states of affairs in the world changes because of the transitory 
nature of the mind-independent properties and privileged statuses of time (Dainton 2010, p. 7).  As the 
opposing view, B-theorists reject time passage and hold that there are no mind-independent time 
properties, but rather that time is a dimension by virtue of which things ‘change’ (Ibid., pp. 27, 38).  Time 
exists, contrary to A-theory views, as an all existing and never changing dimension with events occurring 
in relational terms of earlier and later (Ibid., p. 35).  This is not to say that there are no psychological 
tensed-beliefs used to describe time, i.e. x is present to me now, but rather that the psychological beliefs 
do not correspond to tensed, mind-independent time properties (Ibid.).  To make this move, B-theorists 
hold that psychological terms of time are tokens of a particular event - while a subject forms a token 
belief of an event, such as x occurred yesterday, the token belief is compatible with the B-theory view in 
virtue of the subject holding the token belief  (Ibid., pp. 33, 35).   
 For purposes in my dissertation, I will assume the B-theory, in line with many philosophers who 
hold this view (Baron et. al. 2015, p. 562).  What is pertinent here is that the two distinct metaphysical 
views of time relate to change in different ways, but the B-theory can accommodate many of the 
purported A-theory properties in terms of psychological tokens. With both of these views in mind, we can 
ask, how does time passage relate to the B-theory view?  Put simply, through appeals to introspection.  
The argument that follows, modified for the B-theory, elucidates the introspective elements in question:  
i) Introspection suggests we have experiences of temporal passage. 
ii) If we have experiences of temporal passage, the best explanation for this lies on time passage being a 
psychological, i.e. mind-dependent, phenomenon. 
  
 Conclusion: Introspection on temporal passage suggests a psychological phenomenon. 
         (Baron et. al. 2015, p. 561). 
 It should be noted that there are two distinct explanatory tasks that underpin the argument from 
introspection.  I will expand on this in section three but suffice to say here that this is so because of the B-
theorist rejection of the A-theory metaphysics.  The first is the phenomenological arrow, also known as 
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the temporal present.  The thought behind the phenomenological arrow is that consciousness is 
asymmetric, in that we cannot be aware of the past or future, and is confined to the ‘present’ as it posses 
an immanent direction, pointed forward as we seemingly progress to the future (Dainton, 2010, pp. 29, 
116-117).  The phenomenological arrow is necessary for temporal passage, lest consciousness not be 
confined nor asymmetric at all.  The second explanatory task is explaining our indirect awareness, i.e. 
something we can’t directly perceive, of temporal passage: that time seems to flow to us (Braddon-
Mitchel, 2014, p. 212).  Events apparently pass through time, sometimes described as a sensation of 
temporal passage, flowing from the future to the present, then receding into the past (Paul, 2010, p. 333).  
B-theorists respond to the argument from introspection in two different ways, dividing themselves into 
either the veridicalist or illusionist camps.  I will handle each in turn, but will begin with the illusionist 
view. 
  
 Illusionists accept both the first and second premises of the argument from introspection, 
accepting that introspection suggests temporal passage.  In doing so, illusionists adopt both explanatory 
tasks, of the phenomenological arrow and temporal passage.  Illusionism is by far the most favored theory 
amongst B-theorists (Baron et. al, 2015, p. 561).  Now, the illusionists I am concerned with in this section 
are what I will term Dainton-illusionsits.  These types of illusionists hold that temporal passage is 
explained through, and is inextricable with, our short-term, dynamic perceptual experiences of change 
(Dainton, 2011, pp. 391, 398-399, 404-405; Dainton, 2012, pp. 127-128).   Dainton-illusionists invoke a 1
sui generis sensation of ‘flow’ that accompanies dynamic experiences of change to explain temporal 
passage (Dainton, 2011, pp. 404-405.; Dainton, 2010, p. 116).  The claim can be either an error-theory or 
a projectionist theory.  I will not commit Dainton-illusionists to either, as I think my forthcoming 
argument applies to both.  
  
 The second camp is the veridicalist camp.  Veridicalists have substantially different intuitions 
about temporal passage and reject the first premise, thus rejecting temporal passage.  In doing so, 
veridicalists reject the explanatory task of temporal passage and accept the phenomenological arrow task.  
One way veridicalists do this, as argued by, Christopher Hoerl, is by suggesting that the typical view of 
temporal passage rests on an error in the types of change we experience (Hoerl, 2014, pp. 196-197).  
Hoerl suggests that we are aware of change in two different ways, through short-term dynamic experience 
of change and through awareness of discrete changes over clock-time (Ibid.).  According to Hoerl, the 
structural differences between the two types of change has caused philosophers to conflate one’s 
awareness of the apparent ‘flow’ of dynamic experiences of change with the flow of temporal passage 
(Ibid.) Hoerl thinks Dainton-illusionists are guilty of (Ibid.).  In the forthcoming subsections, I will 
provide a more in-depth analysis of the two types of change and defend Hoerl’s argument.  
 See appendix i for a brief discussion about another interpretation of Dainton’s view.1
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B) Phenomenological Datum of Change 
 If we introspect on our awareness of change, we can find phenomenological datum to explicate 
the types of change we are aware of.  Introspection suggests two types of change, which are demarcated 
clearly through a passage from C.D. Broad: 
 “…to see a second-hand moving is quite a different thing from ‘seeing’ that an hour-hand has 
moved.  In the one case we are concerned with something that happens within a single sensible field; in 
the other we are concerned with a comparison between the contents of two different sensible fields”  
         (Broad, 1923, pp. 351-352). 
While attending to the hour-hand of a clock, one is aware of change which I will refer to as changes of 
mere variation.  Mere variation change is an awareness of change at discrete moments through clock-
time, where one becomes aware of the change through inference and recollection (Phillips, 2011, pp. 
813-814; Hoerl, 2013, p. 388).   
 Contrasting with mere variation change, as the type of change my dissertation will focus on, is the 
dynamic experience of the second-hand.  What is clear from Broad’s example is that we are simply aware 
of short-term change as it unfolds before us.  There is nothing inferential about the short-term change we 
are aware of, and we are aware of the change as a dynamic experience (Le Poidevin, 2007, p. 87).  The 
second-hand moves in a uniform manner, with a particular spatial order and structure, without pause into 
each new spatial location it will occupy (Hoerl, 2013, p. 388). While attending to the second-hand’s 
movement, one is simply aware of it changing spatial locations, as the second-hand changes in a uniform 
manner, with structure and order (Ibid.).  Dynamic experiences of change have a distinct phenomenology, 
clearly contrasted with the hour-hand case.  While aware of the second-hand’s movement, it seems to one 
that the change is occurring before them, that they are perceiving the change (Le Poidevin, 2007, p. 87).  
There seems to be some ambiguity as to whether or not every short-term experience of change is a 
dynamic experience, as Ian Phillips intimates this quite strongly at some points (2008, p. 199).  However, 
I will avoid this for purposes here and maintain that there is a distinctness with this type of change, where 
one is simply aware of the change as it unfolds before them.  I will refer to this change as a dynamic 
experience of change. 
 I think the distinction between how we become aware of these two types of change holds in 
general.  The faculties and capacities required to become aware of each kind of change confirms the 
distinction is warranted.  The inference and faculties required for one to be consciously aware of the mere 
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variation changes are greater than that of dynamic experiences of change.  With cases of mere variation, 
there are perceptual capacities at play, along with an actual conscious judgment and the necessary 
remembrance of the object in question before one is aware of the object’s change.  Using the clock 
example, in order to recognize that the hour-hand has moved on the clock, a subject must consciously 
recall and judge the hour-hand’s position as being different than its current position.  The subject is not 
simply aware of change with mere variation, but must consciously infer the change of the hour-hand’s 
spatial location to be aware of the change.  On the other hand, there is the robust case of the second-hand.  
The second-hand is a more robust, dynamic experience of change, where the subject is simply aware of 
the change occurring before them.  There is only the employment of the perceptual capacities, with no 
obvious conscious inference involved nor the obvious exercising of memory.  While attending to the 
second-hand of a clock slowly fulfill its intended arc around a clock, one just is simply aware of the 
second-hand’s movement.  Conscious judgment and recollection is completely unnecessary for dynamic 
experiences of change.  The clear demarcations between a subject’s awareness of change through mere 
variation and dynamic experiences suggests that the distinction is warranted. 
C) Revisiting Hoerl 
 I think Hoerl’s conflation charge against the Dainton-illusionist has merit.  How one becomes 
aware of dynamic experiences of change is such that the subject actual perceives the change as it occurs 
(Le Poidevin, 2007, p. 87).  I think Hoerl is right that how we become aware of dynamic experiences of 
change leaves dynamic experiences of change susceptible to conflation with the Dainton-illusionists 
‘time-flow’ (Hoerl, 2014, pp. 196-198).  Hoerl’s charge becomes more transparent if we examine a strong 
claim the Dainton-illusionist can make, i.e. that every dynamic experience of change is necessary and 
sufficient for temporal passage.  If we take the example of viewing a street light flickering quickly, say 
twenty times over three seconds, it is not obvious that this is accompanied with temporal passage.  One 
would have, perhaps several, dynamic experiences of change while watching the intensity of the light 
increase and diminish to absence.  However, it is not obvious that every cyclical change is accompanied 
with the sensation of temporal passage, of each intensity change passing through time.  Rather, I contend, 
there is no obvious temporal passage while one is aware of the change.  This presents a problem for the 
Dainton-illusionist because it is through dynamic experiences of change that we have the purported 
sensation of temporal passage (Dainton, 2011, pp. 391, 398-399).  However, it seems quite plausible that 
not every dynamic experience of change is accompanied with temporal passage - but our awareness of the 
change in question certainly is.  Watching the street light flicker can be described purely in terms of 
change, without temporal passage. 
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 If we turn to a weaker claim that Dainton-illusionists can make, I think Hoerl’s conflation charge 
becomes far more clear.  The weaker claim could be that only some dynamic experiences of change are 
necessary and sufficient for temporal passage.  However, the weaker claim openly intimates that dynamic 
experiences of change are conflated with, and come apart from, temporal passage.  The separation of the 
two suggests, quite strongly, that there are two different types of temporal phenomena being conflated into 
one type of phenomenon.  There is the transcending temporal passage phenomenon that comes apart from 
the phenomenon that is meant to explain it, dynamic experiences of change.  I think this helps to justify 
Hoerl’s claim and his rejection of the transcending time-flow.  As Hoerl rightly points out, there is only 
one temporal phenomenon occurring when one perceives change as a dynamic experience of change 
(Hoerl, 2014, p. 197).  And if this is so, it is not clear precisely what positing temporal passage adds to the 
mix.  Temporal passage is a distinct psychological phenomenon, if it exists at all, that needs to be 
explained alongside dynamic experiences of change - not through dynamic experiences of change.  In this 
light, Hoerl seems quite right in suggesting that the distinct phenomenology of dynamic experiences of 
change is susceptible to conflation, and has been conflated with, the transcending temporal passage 
phenomenon (Ibid.).  What is crucial for Hoerl’s argument, though, is that temporal passage seems to be 
left unanswered if the two phenomena can come apart.  
 I suspect the Dainton-illusionist would respond by objecting that temporal passage occurs with 
every dynamic experience of change, but the subject is merely unaware of the temporal passage.  I do not 
find this response compelling, at least not without further explanatory work.  Based on the nature of 
dynamic experiences of change, one simply is aware of the change (Le Poidevin, 2007, p. 87).  One 
should simply just be aware of temporal passage, too.  It is not obvious that temporal passage, and 
temporal passage alone, would require ‘extra attention’ from the subject or be opaque to the subject.  
Even with an extended event, i.e. several successive dynamic experiences of change, one should simply 
be aware of the temporal passage phenomenon.  A subject being aware of dynamic experiences of change, 
but unaware of the sensation of temporal passage, seems to defy the nature of the experiences that is 
meant to explain temporal passage.  I think this point helps Hoerl’s view because it can be maintained that 
there has been a conflation by the Dainton-illusionsit.  More importantly, it can be suggested that how we 
become aware of dynamic experiences of change is susceptible to conflation with time-flow because of 
the nature of how we become are aware of dynamic experiences of change (Hoerl, 2014, pp. 196-197).  
The rejection of the transcending temporal passage phenomenon can be maintained because it is conflated 
with dynamic experiences of change. 
  
 What I think Hoerl gets wrong is that he does not provide a firm demarcation for what the 
rejection of temporal passage should amount to.  Hoerl, rightfully, rejects the ‘time-flow’ Dainton-
illusoinists posit because it is conflated with the types of change involved with dynamic experiences of 
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change (Ibid.).  However, this rejection need not mean that one cannot be aware of time passage in terms 
of inferring and recollecting change.  Like with the hour-hand of a clock, one can recollect previous states 
of affairs and infer from new perceptual data that time is passing, in the sense that states of affairs are 
changing.  I see no reason why a subject cannot consciously recollect and infer, after a dynamic 
experience of change, that clock-time is passing.  Nor do I see a reason precluding that one can infer 
clock-time is passing through inference while undergoing a dynamic experience of change.  Moreover, 
veridicalists should affirm that dynamic experiences of change do have a temporal order and structure; 
and that due to the immanent directional nature of consciousness, one becomes aware of, and can be no 
longer aware of, objects and events.  This does not intimate nor offer concessions to the presence of 
temporal passage.  What must be rejected is only that we have experiences of a special time-flow.  We can 
become aware of time passage in the sense of inferring that things are changing and recollecting previous 
states of affairs.  With a firmer demarcation, the veridicalist claim is far more wholesome than what is 
implied with the rejection of temporal passage. 
 To conclude this section, I want to reiterate the main points of this subsection.  Explaining 
temporal passage through dynamic experiences of change is quite dubious.  How we become aware of 
dynamic experiences of change leaves open the real possibility of mistaking and conflating the nature of 
our awareness of change with a special time-flow.  With this point in mind, veridicalists can still maintain 
a sense in which we are aware of time passage while rejecting temporal passage.  In the next section, I 
will introduce extensionalism as an account of the phenomenological arrow that veridicalists need. 
 Section II: 
 In this section I will provide a brief exposition of extensionalism.  I will, then, argue that 
extensionalism can satisfy certain criteria for introspection by adopting the principle of inheritance.  After, 
I will argue that my construction of extensionalism is a natural fit for veridicalists and will conclude with 
a brief remark about the simplicity and naive nature of extensionalism. 
A) Extensionalism 
 Extensionalism’s fundamental claim is that conscious experiences are essentially extended.  The 
corner stone to the extensionalist model is a metaphysical claim, that consciousness is not instantaneous 
but is fundamentally extended as, what I will term, a temporally extended unit (Phillips, 2014b, p. 149).  
This claim is not to be construed as extended for several seconds or more, but rather as the maximum 
amount of change that a subject can discriminate and be aware of - usually interpreted as about half a 
second (Hoerl, 2013, pp. 387-388).  When an object, or objects, within the temporally extended unit 
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change sufficiently enough for one to be aware of a discriminable amount of change, the subject has a 
dynamic experience of change (Ibid.).  The lower bound for discrimination and awareness of change is 
understood as the limits of a subject’s capacity and ability to discriminate change (Ibid., pp. 388, 
390-391).  This explains why a subject cannot become aware of a clock’s hour-hand. The hour-hand 
changes in position too slowly for a discriminable amount of change (Ibid., p. 388).  Now, there are 
dynamic experiences of change with brief durations of no change.  One example is the second-hand of a 
clock, where at very brief, microscopic intervals the second-hand is motionless (Phillips, 2011, pp. 
816-817, 821).  Extensionalists explain this by appealing to determinability.  Determinability is the 
thought that although there may be very brief durations with indiscriminable change, the subject 
temporally experiences change because of an overall, sufficient amount of discriminable change (Ibid., 
pp. 819-821).  The subject simply experiences the brief changeless intervals that fall beneath their 
capacity and ability to discriminate change imprecisely (Ibid.).  This is why the second-hand of a clock 
seems to be in constant motion, with a steady duration of motion, even though it may be motionless at 
microscopic instants.  In short, extensionalists hold that conscious experiences are essentially extended 
with higher and lower bounds of discriminability. 
 There is one immediate objection to extensionalism that I would like to dispel.  Shouldn’t one 
temporally experience everything, change and objects included, all at once?  Not quite.  Extensionalism’s 
fundamental claim is that conscious experiences are extended (Phillips, 2014b, p. 149), but not that one is 
aware of, nor that they experience, all of the change and objects within the temporally extended unit 
simultaneously.  Extensionalism’s claim is to be understood as the subject temporally experiencing 
objects and change in relation to the total amount of change of the objects in question (Ibid., p. 150).  Our 
temporal experiences of change are experienced the way they are in virtue of the relations of the changing 
object, or objects, within the temporally extended unit (Ibid.).  We can elucidate this point with several 
objects of experience, such as hearing Do-Re-Mi, although this line of reasoning can also apply to a 
single changing object.  When one hears the notes Do-Re-Mi, their temporal experience is of the Do-Re-
Mi in that particular order, with each note heard in turn, because of the changing notes relations within 
the temporally extended unit.  However, one is not aware of, nor temporally experiencing, all of the 
objects and change all at once.  Rather, each object is temporally experienced in turn, in a unified, 
structured, and ordered manner.  Extensionalists only commit themselves to the notion that we are aware 
of change, and of the objects of experience as they change, as the change unfolds through clock-time 
within the temporally extended unit. 
  
B: Introspection and Inheritance 
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 With extensionalism exhibited, I can discuss if extensionalism is supported by introspection.  
Introspection suggests that our perceptual experiences are transparent and that how they seem entails how 
they actually are.  Extensionalism must satisfy these two criteria to be supported by introspection.  
Transparency is a common assumption in the philosophy of perception, and I will present it neutrally to 
avoid many of the surrounding debates.  Transparency is the idea that introspection on our perceptual 
experiences suggests the actual objects involved are the objects of perception, without a medium such as 
sense-data (Prosser, 2016, p. 133).  The problem for extensionalists is that they need a supporting view 
that allows for introspection to suggest that our temporal experiences are transparent to the objects of 
experience and particular temporal properties, i.e. temporal structure.  Turning to seems-is entailment, 
seems-is entailment is the thought that rational introspection on our temporal experiences cannot seem to 
us as being one way but actually be another  (Phillips, 2010, pp. 183, 186.).  We should not be 
systematically misled about the nature of our temporal experiences, such as there being numerous 
metaphysical tokens of the same object of experience that is not apparent on introspection (Ibid.).  In 
other words, when viewing a red ball for an extended period, introspection suggests that there is only one 
red ball tokened and experienced - not several distinct metaphysical tokens of the red ball.  In order to be 
supported by introspection, extensionalism should properly accommodate transparency and seems-is 
entailment. 
 One way for extensionalists to meet the challenges of introspection is through adopting the 
principle of inheritance.   Extensionalists are well aware of perceptual illusions, and I will discuss this 2
shortly, but for simplicity I will discuss inheritance and extensionalism in terms of the veridical cases.  
Inheritance is the thought that the subject’s experience is inherited, as a one-way mirror, from the 
objective temporal structure of the experience; the subject’s experience is identical to the objective 
temporal structure of the experience (Phillips, 2014a, p. 133).  The objective temporal structure is 
constituted by the temporal properties at hand, and the objects of perception, including their relations to 
one another (Ibid.; Phillips, 2014b, p. 150).  The type of temporal properties we are concerned with here 
are of the immanent directional nature of consciousness,  and the unity, structure and order of the objects 3
temporally experienced by the subject (Phillips, 2010, p. 189).  Returning to transparency and seems-is 
entailment, inheritance satisfies these requirements easily.  Because the subject’s experience is inherited 
from the objective temporal structure, the properties in question, i.e. unity, phenomenal direction, 
structure and order, and the objects are what the subject’s experience corresponds to (Phillips, 2014a, p. 
133).  The subject’s experience is of, and transparent to, the temporal properties and objects that are a part 
of the temporal structure of the experience.  Furthermore, the subject’s experience seems how it actually 
 There is no necessary commitment to adopt inheritance, however I will construct extensionalism with it.  See Phillips (2014a) for a defense of 2
the inheritance principle. 
 Phillips suggests an ambiguous ‘flow of experience,’ which I construe as the inherent directional nature of consciousness for purposes here 3
(2008, p. 189).
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is, without positing metaphysically distinct tokens.  The temporal structure of a set of objects are of the 
objects in question, being numerically the same (Dainton, 2011, p. 400).  The subject’s experience is 
inherited and when the same object is within the temporally extended unit, the temporal structure is 
experienced by the subject as of the same object (Ibid.; Phillips, 2014a, p. 133).  With inheritance, 
extensionalism easily satisfies both transparency and seems-is entailment. 
 Now, it should be asked, can this view withstand the common vehicle-content conflation 
objection?  This account of extensionalism is highly susceptible to the charge.  The charge comes from 
the representational view of perception and suggests an illicit move, that the representational contents of 
the experience are conflated with the properties, i.e. perceptual data, that are retained by the vehicle of 
those contents (Tye, 2003, pp. 90-91; Hoerl, 2017, p. 178-179).  I do not think this objection is fatal for 
extensionalists. The vehicle-content objection only holds force if extensionalists presuppose 
representationalism and representationalist assumptions.  I think extensionalists and veridicalists should 
turn to the naive realist view of perception to withstand this charge.   Naive realism is the view that the 4
subject stands in metaphysical relation, e.g. spatial perspective, with the objects of perception (Martin, 
2006, p. 404).  The objects of perception constitute, at least partly, the phenomenological character of the 
subject’s experience (Ibid, p. 354).  The claim that is most useful against this charge is the latter claim, 
that the objects of perception constitute the phenomenological character of the experience.  While 
operating under this assumption, extensionalists are under no obligation to accommodate 
representationalist views of perception and can reject any explanation is necessary.  Rejecting 
representationalism and adopting naive realism would also help veridcialist ward off illusionist accounts 
of temporal passage.  If veridicalists reject the representational view, veridicalists will have one less 
worry about temporal passage being represented to the subject.  There need not be any representation of 
temporal passage with naive realism.  The only thing the subject would perceive would be the objects of 
perception.  Naive realism is perfectly compatible with veridicialism and extensionalism. 
 With the inheritance principle explicated and introspection secured, we can now briefly turn to 
the more complicated illusory cases.  For clarity, I will refer to the objective temporal structure I 
mentioned previously as the experiential temporal structure, which the subject inherits.  Extensionalists 
hold that the experiential temporal structure can sometimes mismatch with what should be the actual 
temporal structure of states of affairs in the world (Phillips, 2014a, p. 133).  On the good cases, the 
experiential temporal structure matches with what the temporal structure should be, resulting in a 
veridical temporal experience.  On the bad cases, the experiential temporal structure mismatches with 
what the actual temporal structure should be, resulting in an illusory temporal experience (Ibid.).  For an 
 See appendix note ii for a brief discussion, irrelevant to purposes here, about extensionalism’s place between naive realism and 4
representationalism.
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example of the bad case, we can use a subject’s temporal experience of hearing Do-Re-Mi.  An illusory 
temporal experience of the Do-Re-Mi would be of the experiential temporal structure being of Re-Do-Mi, 
where clearly the experiential temporal structure mismatches with what should be the actual temporal 
structure of the event.  Generally, one’s temporal experience is veridical, but there are illusory cases that 
warrant the distinction (Phillips, 2014b, p. 142).  The illusory cases are typically of postdictive effects, 
where a set of objects perceived within milliseconds apart produce an illusory temporal experience of the 
event (Ibid., pp. 150-151).  Postdictive effects need not worry extensionalists significantly, as it is quite 
plausible that the relation of the objects that one temporally experiences is influenced by the amount of 
objects perceived and the time-proximity of the perception of the objects within one’s temporally 
extended unit (Ibid.).  Extensionalists do have viable explanations to explain the illusory cases while 
keeping the core claims of the view intact. 
C) Phenomenological Arrow, Veridicalism, and Extensionailsm   
  
 I would like to discuss now, in more depth, whether or not the extensionalist view is a viable 
candidate for the veridicalist view of change and as an account of the phenomenological arrow.  I will 
first discuss the former, and for a clearer discussion, I will assume that the subject’s temporal experience 
is not illusory and will bracket the time-lag issue, i.e. the clock-time it takes for a subject to register an 
object of experience.  On its face, the extensionalist view can be utilized to explain dynamic experiences 
of change in terms of strictly change.  When one temporally experiences change in the form of motion, 
perhaps the second-hand of a clock, one experiences the second-hand as moving and changing spatial 
locations.  On the extensionalist view, this is so because the amount of the change that one can be aware 
of occurs within the temporally extended unit and the object changes sufficiently enough for the subject to 
be, non-inferentially, aware of the change (Hoerl, 2013, p. 391).  Further, there is a particular uniformity, 
structure and order to the temporal experience itself.  The subject has a unified, continuous temporal 
experience of the second-hand, with a particular temporal order and structure, as the second-hand 
apparently moves into each spatial location.  This is exactly what veridicalists need to explain dynamic 
experiences of change.  Moreover, veridicalists can maintain that there is an order and strucutre, in terms 
of earlier-later, and that the subject can infer time is passing from their awareness of change.  While 
viewing the second-hand’s movement, the subject is simply aware of, and can infer that, time is passing as 
the second-hand changes spatial locations.  Veridicalists need only to appeal to extensionalism to explain 
the dynamic experiences of change.   
   
 Turning to the phenomenological arrow, the extensionalist model is a natural fit for veridicalists. 
The key claim to extensionalism is that conscious experiences are essentially extended (Phillips, 2014b, p. 
149).  Furthermore, one of the ever present temporal properties of consciousness is that there is a 
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continual direction, a continual apparent progression through clock-time (Phillips, 2010, p. 189; Dainton, 
2010, pp. 29, 116-117).  Consciousness need not be construed as anything reminisce of temporal passage, 
but rather as an apparent temporal present, continuing onward in a single asymmetric direction.  While the 
temporally extended unit continually progresses onward, one becomes aware of new objects and 
experiences change, is no longer aware of previous objects, and one’s stream of consciousness garners 
new information about the world asymmetrically.  The veridicalist can maintain that one can become 
aware of, and no longer be aware of, the objects of experience while maintaining their rejection of 
temporal passage.  On the extensionalist view, veridicalists can claim that the phenomenological arrow is 
the subject’s temporally extended unit, progressing through clock-time and providing one with a continual 
stream of consciousness.  Moreover, not every experience needs to be a dynamic experience of change.  
Perhaps one is just sitting in an unchanging room, with no perceptible change.  On this view, the 
phenomenological arrow is still accounted for, and even with no noticeable change present, the subject 
continues to experience their stream of consciousness continuing on through clock-time.  All the 
veridicalist must affirm is that when dynamic experiences of change do occur, they occur because of an 
object’s change within one’s temporally extended unit.  Accordingly, extensionalism does adequately 
satisfy the veridicalist’s need to account for the phenomenological arrow.  5
  
 There is one immediate objection that I wish to dispel against my construction of extensionalism.  
It could be objected that if the temporal extended unit is continually progressing through clock-time, there 
could never be a discernible demarcation of the maximum amount of change one can be aware of.  I do 
not think that this sort of objection holds much force.  Consciousness is quite dynamic and is always 
changing, especially in terms of the change that a subject temporally experiences.  One can be aware of 
sufficient amounts of change as the temporally extended unit continues on, but one can only be aware of 
so much change that occurs within the temporally extended unit.  However, this does not preclude the 
possibility that one can be aware of continual successive changes, as consciousness progresses through 
clock-time. What it does mean, though, is that while the temporally extended unit is continuous, and 
assuming a continuous dynamic experience of change, the relations of a changing object, or objects, 
results in a different temporal experience for the subject throughout the duration of the event.  Using the 
example of a clock, one can be aware of a second-hand’s movement over several seconds, and can 
continue to be aware of the movement as it occurs within the temporally extended unit.  The subject thus 
has continuous, but different, temporal experiences of the motion of the second-hand as the spatial 
locations, and their relations to one another, continue to change.  Extensionalists need not worry about 
this type of objection, and must only affirm that only so much change is discriminable within the 
temporally extended unit as it progresses. 
  See appendix iii for a discussion, escaping purposes here, about the B-theory view of causation and extensionalism.5
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 To conclude this section, I would like to offer one final brief remark about why veridicalists 
should endorse the extensionalist model.  Not only can extensionalism accommodate the 
phenomenological arrow and dynamic experience of change, but the model is quite simplistic and naive in 
nature.  This is a claim usually championed by extensionalists (Phillips, 2014b, pp. 142-143).  Its three 
core commitments, as I interpret it, are as follows:  
i) Conscious experiences are essentially extended.  
ii) There is an inherited experiential temporal structure with temporal properties. 
iii)  The experiential temporal structure matches or mismatches with what the actual temporal structure 
should be. 
         (Ibid., pp. 142-143, 149) 
With these commitments, the subject’s temporal experiences correspond to the experiential temporal 
structure, in turn, placing the subject in direct contact with the external world.  The subject’s temporal 
experience is of the objects of experience changing, as the change unfolds before them in the external 
world.  The only complication that arrises is with the bad cases of temporal structure matching, such as 
postdictive effects.  However, the bad cases can be properly accommodated allowing extensionalism to 
retain its status as a naive and simple model that purports to place the subject in direct contact with the 
external world.  In all, extensionalism places the subject in direct contact with the objects of perception 
and provides a simple, explanatory account of dynamic experiences of change and the phenomenological 
arrow. 
 Section III:    6
 In this section I want to discuss how starting with an explanation of the phenomenological arrow 
and temporal present can benefit the veridicalist view.  I will argue that veridicalists should adopt a 
different pre-theoretical view of the temporal present, in relation to the B-theory, and a perdurance 
conception of the self to make their rejection of temporal passage more persuasive.  I will speak of 
illusionism more generally in this section, and expect many of my points to be better received by those 
who are more neutral on the subject.  
A) A Different View of the Debate 
  
 I think there is a clear distinction between the two tasks once the A-theory is rejected.  Robin Le 
Poidevin seems to intimate a similar assumption (Le Poidevin, 2015, p. 469).  On the one hand, there is 
 See appendix iv for a discussion, irrelevant to purposes here, for the intelligibility problem illusoinsits face.6
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the phenomenological arrow, as a seemingly confined present with an immanent asymmetric and 
directional nature pointing ‘forward’ (Ibid., pp. 467-468).  On the other hand, there is temporal passage, 
where the illusionist claims that we also have a sense of temporal passage (Ibid., p. 469).  The motivation, 
I think, for temporal passage is the legacy of, what I will use as an exemplar for present purposes, the 
traditional A-theory: the future becomes the present, then recedes into the past, corresponding to temporal 
passage, while the transitive present, corresponding to the temporal present, progresses forward to the 
future (Williams, 1992, p. 123).  However, I think these two tasks come apart.  If we simply begin with 
the phenomenological arrow, all this entails is successive temporal presents.  The illusionist, however, 
needs something more - they need an account of how events pass through time, from the future, to the 
present, and then into the past (Paul, 2010, p. 333).  Temporal passage is of something more than just the 
phenomenological arrow.  Temporal passage is a transcending temporal experience, that must necessarily 
occur at the confined temporal present, but be of the transcending time-flow reminisce of a world with A-
theory like time properties (Braddon-Mitchel, 2014, p. 212).  Nonetheless, there are two separate 
psychological phenomena requiring two distinct explanations here. 
 Now I think veridicalists can capitalize on the phenomenological arrow and suggest an alternative 
pre-theoretical view of the temporal present.  Veridicalists should point out that there are two ways to 
interpret the phenomenological arrow and temporal present.  On one, we become aware of successive 
presents - we become aware of objects and events at the temporal present through successive temporal 
presents.  This, in itself, does not entail the transcending sensation of temporal passage.  On the other, 
objects and events seem to pass through time at the temporal present, as they flow from the future and 
recede into the past.  In spatial terms we can imagine this as looking out the window of a moving car: the 
former is of us simply becoming aware of, and no longer being aware of, objects and events as we pass 
them by while moving forward, while on the latter we have a sensation of objects and events passing us 
by as we seemingly move forward.  Veridicalists should take on the former view and reject the latter view.  
Veridicalists should point out, much of temporal passage makes sense only against the backdrop of the A-
theorist view.  The assumptions intimate that we have somewhere to move to and away from.  Events 
seemingly pass, from the future and arrive to the present where we reside, then recede, away from us, into 
the past (Paul, 2010, p. 333).  However, as I think veridicalists should maintain, the A-theory has been 
rejected.  Yet, even though the A-theory framework has been rejected, the purported phenomenology of 
temporal passage has failed to follow suit.  Veridicalists need to suggest that temporal passage, even if it 
occurs at the temporal present, is still loaded with A-theory assumptions.  Many illusionists simply take 
for granted the embedded A-theory assumptions on the B-theory view. 
   
 I think that a part of the problem with temporal passage intuitions is how we think of ourselves 
against the backdrop of the traditional A-theory.  Against the A-theory assumptions, we think of ourselves 
!19
as enduring through time: we persist and extend through time, with ourselves being wholly present at a 
particular point in time (Velleman, 2006, p. 4).  This conception is clearly against a backdrop of A-theory 
assumptions and neglects the temporal aspects of how we conceive the self.  However, I do not think this 
matches with how we think of ourselves on the B-theory.  On the B-theory, we think of ourselves as 
perduring through time, as existing in space with temporal parts (Ibid., pp. 3, 5-6).  Through how we 
imagine ourselves, in the past and and in the future, we conceive of ourselves as illusorily extending 
through time (Ibid., pp. 5-6).  Consider a drive that you have taken yesterday.  While remembering the 
drive, there are two “I’s,” conflated into one “I” (Ibid., pp. 5-6).  You think of yourself, from your own 
perspective, as driving - only in the past.  However, without handling the phenomenology with care, we 
are highly prone to conflate the current self - the imagining self - with the perspective we have of 
ourselves existing in the past (Ibid.).  These are two separate selves, though, being conflated into one self 
that exists only at the current imaginative project (Ibid.).  This gives us a sense of ourselves extending 
through time, as an illusory extended self, intimating temporal passage (Ibid., pp. 13-14).  When we 
recognize this, it becomes clear that we do tend to think of ourselves against the traditional A-theory 
assumptions even though B-theorists have rejected those assumptions.  Accordingly, once we recognize 
and reject the illusory extended self, we can reject temporal passage and the misguided underpinning 
intuitions (Ibid.).   
 With the debate framed this way, I think veridicalists fare much better against temporal passage.  
We can return to Hoerl’s claim to explain the apparent time-flow involved.  Recall, Hoerl thinks that how 
we become aware of dynamic experiences of change is susceptible to conflation with a special time-flow, 
as Dainton-illusionists have mistakenly done (Hoerl, 2014, pp. 196-197).  Now, if we consider that many 
of our everyday experiences are of dynamic experiences of change, Hoerl’s case seems quite reasonable.  
The phenomenology of temporal passage could very well rest on the neglected structure of how we 
become aware of dynamic experiences of change - resulting in the systemic, yet mistaken, impression that 
there is a special ‘time-flow’ involved (Ibid.).  Moreover, when the legacy of the A-theory is rejected, and 
the temporal parts of how we think of the self as extending through time is illuminated, the veridicalist 
case is much more plausible.  Without proper care taken of how we become aware of dynamic 
experiences of change, this only encourages misleading intuitions about the sensation of temporal passage 
(Ibid., p. 197).  Now, all veridicalists must affirm is that we have a privileged temporal present, rejecting 
an illusory property of present, in virtue of which we have an indexical ‘now’ where our temporal 
experiences occur.  I have constructed extensionalism, with the temporally extended unit, as a perfect 
candidate for this view.  Moreover, veridicalists can maintain that we do become aware of new objects 
and events, and can no longer be aware of them, because of our temporal experiences and the immanent 
direction of consciousness, but not because of temporal passage. 
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 Perhaps an objection could be made to my discussion thus far by appealing to obvious temporal 
experiences of the apparent ‘slowing’ and ‘speeding up’ of time.  It seems quite plausible, indeed, that 
while waiting for the bus one’s temporal experience seems to slow.  However, I do not think this objection 
holds much force as evidence of time passage if veridicalists appeal to executive thoughts (Phillips, 2012, 
pp. 289-291).   Executive thoughts are higher-order thoughts about things that require ‘extra’ mental 
activity (Ibid.).  The thought is that as more executive thoughts flood one’s stream of consciousness, the 
more that our temporal experiences of change can seem to slow; on the converse, our temporal 
experiences seem to speed up (Ibid.).  Temporal experiences need not apparently slow down because of 
apparent time-flow, but rather because of the amount of mental activity and executive thoughts that a 
subject has (Ibid., pp. 297-298).  An appeal to executive thoughts, very well, helps veridicalists to explain 
these types of phenomena while simultaneously closing off an illusionist’s suggestion of temporal 
passage.  Moreover, appealing to executive thoughts is compatible with a veridicalist extensionalist view 
and recollection-inferential awareness of time passage.  Veridcalist extensionalists need not commit to the 
idea that the consciousness, in objective clock-time terms, has a slower rate - only that one’s temporal 
experiences of change seem to them to have a slower or quick rate.  If veridicalist extensionalists appeal 
to executive thoughts, they can maintain their rejection of temporal passage while providing an adequate 
response to a subject’s perceived rate of change.  
Conclusion: 
 In my dissertation I set out to answer the question, can extensionalism accommodate the 
veridcalist rejection of temporal passage?  I answered this question in the affirmitive.  I began by framing 
the current debate, and bolstered Christopher Hoerl’s veridicalist view and suggested that there is a sense 
in which we can be aware of time passage.  Then, I constructed extensionalism as a viable view of the 
phenomenological arrow that is compatible with veridicalism.  In the last section, I explored how a 
different approach to the temporal present and a perdurance conception of the self can aid the veridicalist 
position.  I want to conclude my dissertation with a next step I think veridicalist extensoinalists should 
make.  I think veridcalist extensionalists should relinquish the dogma of William James' Specious Present 
Theory and use more neutral language to describe extensoinalism.  This has been suggested by others,  7
yet James’ legacy persists with extensionalists.   An attentive viewer familiar with the literature will 8
notice that I have used more neutral language than is frequently employed by extensionalists.  The 
motivation of James’ theory was to explain illusory temporal passage through dynamic experiences of 
change; what he terms as the specious present I referred to as the temporally extended unit (James, 1950, 
 See: Callender, (2008).7
 See: Phillips (2008, 2012), Hoerl (2014); Dainton (2010, 2011).8
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pp. 620, 630).  Extensionalists should champion the view as a means of explaining the phenomenological 
arrow and change instead.  Moreover, it is not clear what is specious on the extensionalists view, except 
for the bad cases of temporal structure matching.  I do not think that extensionalism needs to be affected 
so largely by the legacy of James’ work any more, especially if extensionalism is construed as a story 
about the phenomenological arrow and temporal present.  Extensionalism should be viewed just as it is, 
as a fundamental view about our temporal experiences, change, and how our temporal experiences relate 
us to the external world. 
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Appendix: 
i) A Different View of Dainton 
 In Christopher Hoerl’s paper discussing his rejection of temporal passage, he briefly notes a 
plausible and different view of Dainton’s view.  Hoerl thinks that it is quite plausible the flow involved is 
of a different type of ‘flow,’ not necessarily temporal passage (Hoerl, 2014, p. 199, footnote 10).  It is 
reasonable, as Hoerl supposses, that this could be the case.  Dainton himself refers to it as a type of 
‘phenomenal flow’ at some points (Dainton, 2011, pp. 398-399).  However, I think there is a 
preponderance of evidence suggesting that what Dainton has in mind is, indeed, temporal passage.  First, 
the title to Dainton’s contribution to the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time is “Time, Passage, and 
Immediate Experience” (Dainton, 2011).  Moreover, Dainton discusses temporal passage and flow several 
times.  He writes: “Might we not be projecting passage onto the world in the same way as we project 
colour?” (2011, p. 383); “Because I am directly aware of the passage of time” (Ibid., 384);  and, after 
discussing dynamic experiences of change (Ibid., p. 404), Dainton writes: “There are also dynamic 
conceptions of time, conceptions which, in one way or another, find room for temporal passage…Might it 
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be that the appearance of passage can be accounted for in easier or more compelling way if passage is in 
fact real?” (Ibid., p. 405); all italics Dainton’s.  It is a fair move, as Hoerl suggests, to leave Dainton the 
room to suggest a different type of flow than temporal passage, but it is quite reasonable to presume that 
Dainton does, indeed, have the special time-flow in mind.  I will assume this here for the purposes of my 
dissertation.  Either way, as Hoerl rightfully notes, whatever flow Dainton does have in mind is an anti-
reductionist flow, i.e. that the flow transcends more than what is just present in change (Hoerl, 2014, p. 
199, footnote 10).  The arguments I will put forth apply to either equally. 
ii) Discussion on Extesionalism’s Place Between Representationalism and Naive Realism 
 In my dissertation I am advocating for the naive realist view.  However, it is not so clear that 
extesionalism should be monopolized by the naive realist view.  As I have construed extesionalism, with 
the inheritance principle, it is quite obvious that naive realism is a natural fit for the view.  The idea of 
temporal structure and order, especially with the ‘inheritance of objects of perception’ is quite compatible 
with the naive realist view, that the objects of perception constitute, in part, the phenomenal character of 
the objects in question (Martin, 2006, p. 404).  With this said, I do not think this precludes the possibility 
of representationalists endorsing an extesoinalist view.  The other popular view for how we perceive 
dynamic experiences of change is the representationalism view.  I do not want to get too in-depth with 
this view for the discussion at hand, but the rough idea is that consciousness has, in a sense, temporal 
breadth (Dainton, 2011, pp. 392-393, 401-402).  Consciousness is not extended but is instantaneous - with 
distinct metaphysical instants with retentions, of a previous states of affairs, and protensions, of 
anticipated states of affairs, of the objects of experience as consciousness progresses (Ibid., pp. 401-402).  
In spatial terms, one can think of this view as discrete temporal blocks along an X-axis, with depth along 
the Y-axis.  The rough idea with the retentions is that with each metaphysical instant, we are 
simultaneously aware of the previous states of affairs of the world through special ‘retentions’ that are 
somewhere in between memory and the current perceptual state - until the retention drifts away and the 
perceptual data is committed to memory; the protensions exist as anticipations of future states of affairs 
(Dainton).  Now, this view may be susceptible to the vehicle-content distinction and would likely have to 
reject the principle of inheritance.  I do not think this would be fatal to the endorsement of extensionalism, 
though. 
 I think representationalists could affirm that there is some sort of access we have to the 
phenomenal character of events while still rejecting that one necessarily has access to information stored 
in the vehicle.  I think representationalists could plausibly stay silent on that front.  We can use Roache’s 
definition of conscious perception to elucidate this point.  Roache thinks that there are two senses of 
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perception.  On the one hand, there is perception that is perceptual information that reaches our brain 
(Roache, 1999, p. 234).  On the other, there is conscious information that is available for conscious 
reflection (Ibid.).  The former is unavailable for reflection while the latter is.  I think if Roache’s 
definition is used then there need not be any mention of the vehicle.  The unavailable information could 
be strictly the information retained with the vehicle, while what is consciously perceived is available to 
the subject upon rational reflection.  Roache takes it that there is a perceivable temporal order to events 
under the conscious perception view (Ibid.).  I think representationalists could plausibly use this while 
staying quiet on the vehicle front.  Perhaps, on this view, extensionalism may be compatible with 
representaiontlism.  Nonetheless,  there are other representationalists  that have adopted the notion of an 
extended consciousness, such as Lee’s quasi-extensionalist view (Lee, 2014).  Simon Prosser considers 
Lee’s view as having an extended vehicle, but as an atomist view of consciousness (Prosser, 2016, p. 
137).  It is quite clear that there is some use of extesionalism between the representational view, and 
should not be immediately ruled out as a theory compatible with extesionalism.  
iii)  Temporal Order and Causation on the B-Theory view 
 Robin Le Poidevin suggests that our temporal order can come from a B-theory view of causation.  
Accordingly, there is a causation, in terms of x causing y with the relation of x as earlier and y being later, 
to which we can be aware of through perception and which determines the asymmetric content and 
temporal order of the phenomenological arrow (Le Poidevin, 2015, pp. 467-469).  With extensionalism as 
I have construed it, this is perfectly compatible with this view of causation on the B-theory.  However, 
there are two notes that I would like to make concerning Le Poidevin’s discussion.  Le Poidevin takes it 
that this view of causation is what determines the asymmetric nature of our temporal experiences and the 
temporal order of our temporal experiences (Ibid., 467-468).  Le Poidevin also uses this as a view to 
support the cinematic view of perception, roughly that we derive a ‘time order’ of events from our 
perceptions of those events and the influence of remembered events on perception, ultimately affecting 
the current phenomenology of a perceptual state (Ibid., p. 468).  This, in turn, gives one an idea of time 
order of events (Ibid.).   
 I do not find Le Poidevin’s reasoning persuasive for several reasons.  On the cinematic view, I do 
not find it compelling to distinguish between an experience of succession and a mere succession of 
experiences (See Hoerl, 2014, for a longer discussion).  Moreover, I think the temporal order and 
immanent directional nature of consciousness are temporal properties and are more than mere effects of 
the causal theory.  When we take the example of mismatching temporal experiences, the illusory cases, 
we seem to have a temporal order and asymmetric directional nature of consciousness contrary to the 
explanation that Le Poidevin provides, of the order in which our perceptions occur (Le Poidevin, 2015, p. 
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468).  On the mismatching cases the asymmetric directional nature, temporal structure, and temporal 
order of an event mismatches with the actual perceptions of that event.  Lastly, Le Poidevin’s account of 
the phenomenological arrow is by and large missing what Dainton has termed the confinement doctrine 
(Dainton, 2010, p. 29).  Le Poidevin has left this rather ambiguous, rather opting to just suppose mere 
‘changing perceptual states’ is enough of an explanation for the confinement doctrine (Le Poidevin, 2015, 
pp. 467-468)  Accordingly, I find the extensionalist view with more tools available, and the temporal 
properties therein, to explain temporal experiences comprehensively. 
iv) Error-Theory Problem: 
  
 One point Hoerl makes is that if temporal passage is construed as an error-theory about 
perception, temporal passage faces the intelligibility problem.  The idea is that it is unclear what it would 
mean to suggest a purported mind-independent phenomena, i.e. temporal passage supposedly 
accommodating A-theroy like properties, that does not exist (Hoerl pp. 189-190).  After all, if there is no 
such thing as a property of temporal passage, how can we articulate what it is like for there to be such a 
sensation of temporal passage (Ibid.)?  One merit to this position, as Hoerl notes, is that temporal passage 
would place us in a systematic illusory state that does not correspond to the actual state of affairs in the 
world accurately (Ibid., p. 189).  I think part of what Hoerl misses is what I have suggested in section 
three, that all we can be aware of is at the present, and of, the temporal present.  So, passage must occur at 
the present.  But, it’s not particularly clear how temporal passage can occur if everything at the temporal 
present is, simply, present.  Nonetheless, the illusionist faces two challenges from Hoerl’s criticism.  First, 
they must try to explicate the notion of a mind-dependent temporal passage property that purports to 
correspond to a non-existent mind-independent temporal passage property.  Second, the cost of the view 
should be seriously considered.  If every event we temporally experience is meant to encompass temporal 
passage, somehow, then this means that our overall temporal experiences are, indeed, systematically 
misleading.  This challenge seems unappealing simply because our perception of the world is not 
veridical to the actual states of affairs of the world - depending on the strength of illusionism one 
espouses. 
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